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Upcoming Practices
| DATE AND TIME | TEAM | ROOM | JUDGE | JUDGE | JUDGE | JUDGE | JUDGE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sat. October 1 | |||||||
| 9:00AM - 11:00AM | Tang (Liz/Patrick) | E | Omar de la Cruz | ||||
| 10:00AM - 12:00PM | Tang (Anupa/Michelle) | M120 | |||||
| 10:00AM - 12:00PM | Tang (Yuping & Mitchell) | M120 | |||||
| 12:30PM - 2:30PM | Tang (Yuping & Mitchell) | Room C | |||||
| Sun. October 2 | |||||||
| 10:00AM - 12:00PM | Tang (Liz/Patrick) | B2 | CLOSED | CLOSED | CLOSED | CLOSED | CLOSED |
Teams
Liz Medrano and Patrick Chao
I. Whether the denial of state funding to a church preschool based on its religiously motivated failure to comply with a state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation infringes upon the guarantees of freedom of religion provided by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
A. Does a denial of state funding on this basis substantially burden the free exercise of religion?
B. Does a denial of state funding on this basis create an entanglement of church and state in violation of the Establishment Clause?
II. If a state’s refusal to fund a church preschool because it discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation is found to infringe upon rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause, whether such state action can meet the requirements of strict scrutiny.
A. Can a state have a compelling interest in preventing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation?
B. Is the denial of state funds to organizations that discriminate against same-sex families a means narrowly tailored to prevent discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation?
Last practice October 11.
Alex Andorfer, JR Olson, Mitchell Vanlandingham
The questions under review are:
(1) Whether the City of North Shore Safe Renters Ordinance (“Ordinance”), mandating the verification of immigration status, is preempted by federal law.
(2) Whether a federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction to review de novo a denial of a naturalization application pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) and grant declaratory relief once removal proceedings have begun, or if both are barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1429.
Last practice November 5.
Anupa George & Michelle Pang
I. Whether the denial of state funding to a church preschool based on its religiously motivated failure to comply with a state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation infringes upon the guarantees of freedom of religion provided by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
A. Does a denial of state funding on this basis substantially burden the free exercise of religion?
B. Does a denial of state funding on this basis create an entanglement of church and state in violation of the Establishment Clause?
II. If a state’s refusal to fund a church preschool because it discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation is found to infringe upon rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause, whether such state action can meet the requirements of strict scrutiny.
A. Can a state have a compelling interest in preventing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation?
B. Is the denial of state funds to organizations that discriminate against same-sex families a means narrowly tailored to prevent discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation?
Last practice October 11.
Yuping Lin and Mitchell Song
I. Whether the denial of state funding to a church preschool based on its religiously motivated failure to comply with a state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation infringes upon the guarantees of freedom of religion provided by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
A. Does a denial of state funding on this basis substantially burden the free exercise of religion?
B. Does a denial of state funding on this basis create an entanglement of church and state in violation of the Establishment Clause?
II. If a state’s refusal to fund a church preschool because it discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation is found to infringe upon rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause, whether such state action can meet the requirements of strict scrutiny.
A. Can a state have a compelling interest in preventing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation?
B. Is the denial of state funds to organizations that discriminate against same-sex families a means narrowly tailored to prevent discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation?
Apalsa enacted a statute which removed state funding for public accomodations which discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
Living Mission Church is a non-denominational evangelical Protestant church that has actively supported proposed legislation to ban same-sex marriages in Apalsa. Its pastor, Reverend Jeremy Kim, has repeatedly stated that “God created men to unite with women in marriage,” and the Church has participated in numerous media campaigns to further this message. That this is a sincerely held religious belief of the leadership and members of the Church is not contested.
Living Mission Church also runs a pre-school on its property, which serves 120 students aged 2-5. Established as an independent non-profit corporation in 1981, the preschool was merged into the Church in 1996.Living Mission Church views the preschool as part of its ministry and incorporates Christian religious instruction into its curriculum. The preschool program is affordable and widely regarded as an excellent choice for working parents. As a result, it always has a long waiting list. Like other preschools, both secular and religious, it has fairly consistently received grants from the state for transportation, playground equipment, and subsidized meals.
In 2014 Lily Eun-chae Park and Alicia Kang, a same-sex couple, attempted to put their infant son Philip on the waitlist for the Living Mission Church preschool. Their son's application was rejected, and after several calls to the preschool, Park was informed that because the Church considered homosexuality to be a sin, the preschool did not enroll children of same-sex couples.
In late 2014 the State of Apalsa declared the Church ineligible to participate in “Kids Learn” programs that subsidize school lunches and the purchase of school buses until it changed its admissions policies to comply with the Anti- Discrimination Act. Since then the Church has not applied for any further state funding for its preschool programs. Kids Learn funds were previously granted to the Church and continue to be awarded to other religious organizations. The record does not indicate whether any of these other organizations exclude persons from their programs on the basis of sexual orientation.
Church appears to be the only instance, to date, in which Apalsa has denied funding to a private organization based on the statute’s prohibition of discrimination based upon sexual orientation.
Living Mission Church filed suit in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Apalsa, asserting that the state’s denial of Kids Learn funds violates (i) its First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, and (ii) the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. The district court held that the Anti-Discrimination Act, as applied in this case, did not violate either the First or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and refused to grant relief to the Church. The Fourteenth Circuit reversed this decision.
Last practice October 11.
Madeline Lough-Stevens, Francesca Reifer, Naomi Strauss
On April 16, 2010, Respondent ("Mason") was convicted by a jury of the offense of felony aggravated sexual assault of a child, and was sentenced by Judge Marilyn L. Robbins in Wash County Superior Court.
Mason filed a direct appeal, which was heard in the Court of Appeals on September 10, 2012. On appeal, Mason brought two constitutional claims: (1) the admission of his confession constituted trial court error in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination, including the omission of Miranda warnings prior to questioning; and (2) admitting the written Juvenile Sex Offender Program ("SOM") report at trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. He also argued that his defense counsel's failure to object on constitutional grounds to admission of his confession and the SOM report rendered the assistance of counsel ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment. On January 23, 2013, the Court of Appeals unanimously rejected all of these claims and upheld his conviction, finding no error in the judgment of the superior court.
Mason appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of West Carolina and his case was heard on September 25, 2014. On July 13, 2015, the Supreme Court of West Carolina reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacated Mason's sentence and conviction. The Supreme Court held: (1) the admission of a confession made in a court-ordered SOM program violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, as well as failing to provide Mason with Miranda warnings during his custodial interrogation in the program; (2) the admission of the psychosexual sentencing evaluation violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because it contained testimonial statements of an unavailable witness; (3) Mason has met his burden to prove prejudicial error on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, which violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The State of West Carolina filed a petition for writ of certiorari. On August 3, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is limited to the following questions:
(1) Does admission into evidence of the unwarned statements of a juvenile detainee in a sex offender management program violate the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
(2) Does admission of a written psychosexual evaluation report produced for a prior juvenile sentencing hearing by a now unavailable witness violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment?
(3) Was appellant deprived of the effective assistance of counsel when defense counsel neglected to object to the admission of evidence on Fifth and Sixth Amendment grounds?
Last practice November 1.