Shannon Davis, Irene Lee, & Emily Tripodi

1. Whether prolonged social isolation and lack of environmental stimulation violates the Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

2. Whether the use of solitary confinement on adolescents tried and convicted as adults, when not in response to immediate exigencies, violates the Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

Last practice February 19.

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Nick Hunt, Stephanie Richardson, & Zach Garrison

Questions Presented:

1. Whether prolonged social isolation and lack of environmental stimulation violates the Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

2. Whether use of solitary confinement on adolescents tried and convicted as adults, when not in response to immediate exigencies, violates the Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment

Last practice February 20.

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JP Fisher, Sabah Khokar, Rachel Steyer, Christopher Vitt, Swetha Gopalakrishnan

State of Aurok (“Aurok”) and the Republic of Rakkab (“Rakkab”) agreed to submit to the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) differences between the parties concerning disputes regarding the Kayleff Yak and other matters in accordance with Article 40(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The issues presented before the Court are:

I. Whether Rakkab is responsible for the internationally wrongful acts because DORTA M/S’s actions were attributable to Rakkab, or in the alternative, Rakkab is responsible for its own failure to prevent DORTA from committing those wrongful acts;

II. Whether Rakkab’s harvesting of the Yak violated international obligations relating to the protection of endangered species and the environment, including those under relevant conventions;

III. Whether Rakkab’s harvesting of the Yak violated the cultural and religious rights of the people of Aurok;

IV. Whether Rakkab must compensate Aurok for the appropriation and exploitation of traditional knowledge belonging to the Aurokan people, with profits realized from sales of the drug Gallvectra.

Last practice February 26.

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Kaitlin Carragher, Joe Dietrich, & Justin Bargar

Last practice February 23.

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Maya Galicia-Canto, and Kathryn Hetherington

I. Did Respondents medically neglect their daughter Frannie by failing to provide puberty

blocking treatment (“PBT”) to treat her gender dysphoria which resulted in the

impairment of Frannie’s mental state?

II. Based on the nature of their relationship with their granddaughter Frannie, do Petitioners

have standing to request visitation with Frannie, and is said visitation in her best

interest?

Last practice February 25.

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Colin Schoell, Sarah Casey, & Lauren Marshall

Can an oil company and the US government be held liable for the domestic and global effects of climate change? Come coach our rockstars to find out or decide for yourself! This case encapsulates everything from the political questions doctrine to state action and international causes of actions. 

Last practice February 18.

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Cindy Muro, Elizabeth Silva, Laura Tovar

Issues Presented:

(1) Does the revocation of an individual reporter’s press pass conferring access to White House press briefings and certain White House facilities violate the First Amendment, when the Office of the President stated that it based its revocation on concerns about the individual raised in a law enforcement investigation?

(2) Whether the Office of the President may, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, revoke an individual news reporter’s press pass conferring access to White House press briefings and certain White House facilities without providing pre-deprivation notice and an opportunity to be heard?

Last practice March 18.

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Reid Gaa, Yena Kim, Amrita Sethi

1. Whether under Boyd law, The Royale's iteration of Daily Fantasy Sports constitutes gambling?

2. If no, whether The Royale can lawfully exclude a patron, consistent with the common law, from the entirety of its property based upon the patron's method of playing a game of skill?

Last practice February 27.

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Laura Anderson and Miranda Rowley

I.  Whether, under the Fourth Amendment, the government must secure a warrant issued upon probable cause to directly obtain, from a non-medical commercial service that performs DNA analysis, genetic information related to a medical condition.

II.  Whether, under the Fourth Amendment, the government must have reasonable suspicion to perform a forensic search of an electronic device seized at the United States border.

III.  Whether Federal Rule of Evidence 106 applies to the remainder of or related oral statements, and whether the Rule permits the receipt of otherwise inadmissible evidence.

Last practice March 23.

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Jennifer Bentley, Bekah Young

The BIA Erred by Not Terminating Proceedings Based on Mr. Aguirre's Incompetence Because the Presence of Counsel Was an Insufficient Safeguard Given Mr. Aguirre's "Severely Impaired" Ability to Communicate.    

Although Mr. Aguirre Should be Given the Opportunity to Treat His Condition, This Court Should Find That Substantial Evidence Does Not Support the Denial of His CAT Claims.  

Alternatively, In Light of New Case Law, This Court Should Remand For Reconsideration of Whether Mr. Aguirre's Prior Offense is a "Particularly Serious Crime."

Last practice March 13.

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Marshall Hammons & Alicia Ginsberg

Issue One: Level of Suspicion Required for Forensic Searches at the Border:

I. Whether the Fourth Amendment requires that government officers must have reasonable suspicion before conducting forensic searches of electronic devices at an international border.

Issue Two: Cell-Site Location Information Requests Under Carpenter:

II. Whether the government’s acquisitions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) of three days of cell-site location information, one-hundred cumulative hours of cell-site location information over two weeks, and cell-site location information collected from cell tower dumps violate the Fourth Amendment of an individual in light of this Court’s limitation on the use of cell-site location information in Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __ (2018).

Last practice March 13.

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Erin Lanier and Nicole Vales

This case centers on a conflict between the University of Arivada (University), one of the nation's leading public institutions of higher learning, and Valentina Maria Vega. Ms. Vega was a sophomore at the University's School of Arts and Sciences at the time of the events at issue in this proceeding. On September 12, 2017, the University suspended Ms. Vega after concluding that she had violated the University's Campus Free Speech Policy (Policy) for a second time by materially and substantially infringing upon the rights of others to engage in and listen to expressive activity. The incident at issue here occurred during a speech given by Samuel Payne Drake, Executive Director of "Stop Immigration Now" (SIN), at an event hosted by the University's chapter of "American Students for America" (ASFA).

Issues:

I. Whether the University's Free Speech Campus Policy is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

II. Whether the University's Free Speech Campus Policy, even if constitutional on its face, is unconstitutional as applied to Ms. Vega.

Last practice March 19.

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Catherine Broxon, Bushra Samimi

Issues:

1. Whether the disfavored group analysis is a valid basis to establish a well-founded fear of persecution for the purposes of alylum eligibility

2. Whether the proper party bore the burden of demonstrating if substantial evidence supported a finding that future persecution could be avoided by internal relocation

Last practice February 28.

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Mikaela Bock; Brian Hawkinson

I.  Whether Batson v. Kentucky should extend to the LGBTQ identity?

II.  Whether there is a constitutionally-protected property interest in higher education?

Last practice February 25.

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Ariella Kupetz, Julia Venditti

(1) Whether Batson v. Kentucky should extend to the LGBTQ identity?

(2) Whether there is a constitutionally-protected property interest in higher education?

Last practice February 26.

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Alex Padua, Engram Wilkinson, Shandyn Pierce

ADA

Last practice March 19.

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Holly Locke, Matt Richardson

Last practice February 27.

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Kyle McLean and Paige Adaskaveg

Petitioner Juan Pablo Santos arrived in the United States nearly thirty years ago.  Santos entered the United States near San Diego, California almost thirty years ago in May 1989 and promptly submitted a request for asylum.  More than seven years later, on July 29, 2006, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) notified Santos of its intent to deny his asylum request.  Santos thereafter retained an immigration attorney, and in November 2007, submitted an application for suspension of deportation or special rule cancellation of removal pursuant to NACARA.   He also later submitted an application for cancellation of removal under § 1229b.  

While Santos’s NACARA application was still pending, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged him with removability and initiated proceedings.  CAR 537; see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (removability for presence without admission).  Santos appeared before the Immigration Judge (IJ) on September 11, 2008, admitted the first two factual allegations in the charging document, and conceded removability.  CAR 537; see also CAR 41.  In the interim, on August 5, 2008, USCIS notified Santos that his NACARA application was being referred to an IJ for decision on the issue of whether Santos is barred from relief as a person who “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of others” on account of a protected ground.  CAR 264. 

While in the army, Santos’s primary responsibility was to protect the electrical grid and bridges from attacks by guerrillas.  In carrying out this responsibility, Santos would detain anyone who was suspected of committing a crime.  If that person was also suspected of being a guerrilla, they would be brought back to the base for questioning.  All other suspected criminals were fined and/or jailed for a period of time, and then released.  

The IJ found that the evidence in the record raises the inference that the persecutor bar may apply in this case and shift the burden to Santos to establish he is not barred from relief under NACARA or § 1229b.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the BIA’s application of law to the undisputed facts in this case is a mixed question of law and fact which must be reviewed de novo?
2. Does the evidence in the record raise the inference that the persecutor bar may apply in this case and shift the burden to Santos to establish he is not barred from relief under NACARA or § 1229b?
3. If the evidence in the record raises the inference that the persecutor bar may apply, does Santos meet his burden of rebutting the presumption that the persecutor bar applies?

Last practice March 9.

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Jonathan Ebneyamin, Casey Trang, and Ryan Fallgatter

(1) Did  appellant  consent  to  a  blood  draw  by  virtue  of  California’s implied  consent  statute  and  his  decision  to  drive  on  California  roads  after drinking? 

(2) Did  appellant  expressly  consent  to  a  blood  draw  when  he  applied for  a  California  driver’s  license?  Alternatively,  does  the  good  faith exception  to  the  exclusionary  rule  apply  here  if  police  believed  they  were conducting  a  lawful  search  in  light  of  Vehicle  Code  section  23612 section 13384  ?

Last practice April 3.

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