Reid Gaa, Nicole Vales, Joe Dietrich

Questions Presented:

1. Whether a trial court in a given state, in light of this Court's holding in Daimler, may exercise general personal jurisdiction over a corporation based solely on that corporation's registration to do business in that state.

2. Whether the design of the Model-Herc, manufactured and sold by Marlo Motors, Inc., is defective by virtue of being unreasonably dangerous.

Last practice January 25.

Last practice January 25.

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Zhi "Richard" Li, Atrina Mehdipour, Kendal Mitchell

Background

Skeletron Animation Productions, LLC and its founder Lucifer L. Lyons (collectively "SAP") developed the fantasy character "Skeletron," a dark sorcerer that appeared in videogames, movies, magazines and on billboards throughout the United States in the 1980s. In 2018, SAP sued Cyber Skull Security, Inc. for trademark dilution and false designation of origin arising from Cyber Skull's use of the Skeletron character and name in advertisements and as a useable character within Cyber Skull's augmented reality cybersecurity program. The District Court of Utopia denied the plaintiffs' claims. An appeal is pending.

Questions Presented

• Did the District Court err in finding that Plaintiffs own rights in the SKELETRON trademark and SKELETRON Character design mark?
• Did the District Court err in finding that the SKELETRON trademark and SKELETRON Character design mark are not famous under 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)?
• Did the District Court err in finding that Defendant's use of the SKELETRON trademark and SKELETRON Character design mark did not infringe Plaintiffs' trademark rights?

Last practice February 6.

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Hilda Kajbaf, Neriah Yue, Deborah Brundy

I.  Whether a state conviction for endangerment of a child constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) using the categorical approach. 

II.  Whether a non-citizen’s due process rights are violated during an immigration proceeding in which the immigration judge fails to inform the non-citizen of the availability of discretionary relief from removal under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

In 2017, Ms. Diamond was removed from the United States pursuant to section 1182 of the INA, after an immigration judge found that her two criminal convictions constituted crimes involving moral turpitude. In the fall of 2018, Customs and Border Patrol apprehended Ms. Diamond attempting to re-enter the United States using a counterfeit passport and charged her with a violation of 8 U.S.C. section 1326. Ms. Diamond’s motion to dismiss the indictment was denied by the district court. Her case is now on appeal at the Fourteenth Circuit. To successfully collaterally attack her indictment, Ms. Diamond must prove that either her criminal conviction of child endangerment underpinning her removal was not a crime involving moral turpitude or that her due process rights were violated by the immigration judge's failure to notify her of 212(h) discretionary relief. 

Last practice January 29.

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Shannon Davis, Irene Lee, & Emily Tripodi

1. Whether prolonged social isolation and lack of environmental stimulation violates the Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

2. Whether the use of solitary confinement on adolescents tried and convicted as adults, when not in response to immediate exigencies, violates the Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

Last practice February 19.

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Peter Holl, Arianna Brady, Natalie Ryang

Trademark case dealing with Infringment, Fame, and first amendment. 

Issues 

1) Did the Disctrict Court err in finding that Plaintiffs own rights in the SKELETRON trademark and SKELETRON Character design mark?

2) Did the Distrcirt Court err in finding that the SKELETRON trademark and SKELETRON Character design mark are not famous under 15 U.S.C. Â§ 1125(c)?

3) Did the Disctrict Court err in finding that Defendant's use of the SKELETRONG trademark and SKELETRON Character design mark did not infringe Plaintiffs' trademark rights? 

Last practice February 6.

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Nick Hunt, Stephanie Richardson, & Zach Garrison

Questions Presented:

1. Whether prolonged social isolation and lack of environmental stimulation violates the Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

2. Whether use of solitary confinement on adolescents tried and convicted as adults, when not in response to immediate exigencies, violates the Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment

Last practice February 20.

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JP Fisher, Sabah Khokar, Rachel Steyer, Christopher Vitt, Swetha Gopalakrishnan

State of Aurok (“Aurok”) and the Republic of Rakkab (“Rakkab”) agreed to submit to the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) differences between the parties concerning disputes regarding the Kayleff Yak and other matters in accordance with Article 40(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The issues presented before the Court are:

I. Whether Rakkab is responsible for the internationally wrongful acts because DORTA M/S’s actions were attributable to Rakkab, or in the alternative, Rakkab is responsible for its own failure to prevent DORTA from committing those wrongful acts;

II. Whether Rakkab’s harvesting of the Yak violated international obligations relating to the protection of endangered species and the environment, including those under relevant conventions;

III. Whether Rakkab’s harvesting of the Yak violated the cultural and religious rights of the people of Aurok;

IV. Whether Rakkab must compensate Aurok for the appropriation and exploitation of traditional knowledge belonging to the Aurokan people, with profits realized from sales of the drug Gallvectra.

Last practice February 26.

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