David Kempen, Kate Bredenberg, and Sarah Case

I.  Whether the New Scotland Third Appellate Division correctly determined that Respondent was the lawful beneficiary of the assets in decedent’s estate because she did not willfully or unlawfully kill the decedent within the meaning of the New Scotland slayer statute, but rather was not cognizant of her actions due to Battered Women’s Syndrome.

II.  Whether the New Scotland Third Appellate Division correctly determined that the Respondent is a fit parent even though the mother (1) caused the death of the children’s father after suffering years of his physical and emotional abuse and (2) is only 12 hours into treatment for her mental disorder due to Battered Women’s Syndrome and her substance use.

Last practice February 25.

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Anna Lovelace Owen and Olivia Medina

I. Did the BIA err by classifying a Hawaii Theft Code statute § 708-833(1) conviction as a categorical CIMT, without providing sufficient supporting analysis?

II. The U.S. Supreme Court held in 1951 in Jordan v. De George that the CIMT standard is not impermissibly vague, but the Court only considered its application to offenses involving fraud. In light of recent decisions from the Supreme Court revitalizing the void-for-vagueness doctrine, and recognition by this Court that the CIMT standard is vague, should the CIMT designation be declared unconstitutional?

Last practice March 12.

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Hunter Morrissey and Grace Johnson

I. Whether Petitioner has a well-founded fear of persecution based on past threats against him combined with the growing hostilities against those of the Yan’guan ethnicity in Chakoursia.

II. Whether Petitioner’s due process rights were violated when the presiding Immigration Judge failed to inform him of potential avenues of relief during his initial deportation proceedings.

Last practice March 5.

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Pola Bernabe and Alyssa Ivancevich

Issues on appeal:

1. Does Appellant have a well-founded fear of persecution?

2. Were Applicant’s due process rights violated when he was not informed of potential avenues of relief during his first deportation proceedings?

Last practice March 5.

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An Le, Jesse Sanchez, and Margaret Curran

Legal Questions:

Last practice March 9.

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Adriana Castro, Karla Martinez Rojas, Viridiana Ordonez

Thank you for judging HNBA's practice. The questions presented are:

• A seizure under the Fourth Amendment includes the application of physical force, even when it is unsuccessful in subduing an arrestee. Is an unsuccessful attempt to detain a suspect by use of physical force a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, or must physical force be successful in detaining a suspect to constitute a “seizure”?

• An excessive force claim does not necessarily relate to the validity of an underlying conviction, and a no-contest plea does not preclude an individual from denying fault in subsequent civil action. Is Petitioner’s claim for excessive use of force barred under Heck v. Humphrey because she pleaded no contest to, and was convicted of, aggravated fleeing from a law enforcement officer?

Thank you to our Alumni coach, Laura Tovar, and our faculty representative, Professor Catalina Lozano.   

Please email student coach Marco Ornelas with any questions: marcoornelas@uchastings.edu

Last practice March 5.

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Josie Chan and John Paul

I. Equal Protection

What level of constitutional scrutiny applies to Tyler's claim that McGee's misdemeanor bail statute violates his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment?

Applying the proper level of scrutiny, does the statute violate the Equal Protection Clause?

II. Due Process

What level of constitutional scrutiny applies to Tyler's claim that McGee's misdemeanor bail statute violates his right to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment?

Applying the proper level of scrutiny, does the statute violate his substantive due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment ?

Last practice March 4.

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Gina Ahmar and Sara Zeimer

I. Fourth Amendment Search & Seizure: Was the search and seizure by Chaostown police that took place at Kenny Bearson’s home authorized under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution?

II. Sixth Amendment Due Process; Hearsay: Did the trial court deny Kenny Bearson his constitutional right to present a complete defense in ruling that Leopold Lara, Jr.’s confession was inadmissible, and that the result of the proceedings would not have been different had it been admitted?

Last practice March 7.

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Magdalene Bedi, Sabrina Tran, and Anthony Baldwin

1. Is it appropriate to require the tracing requirement outlined in Barnes for securities purchased in a direct listing, where tracing is often impossible?
   
   
2. Should investment banks acting as financial advisors be held liable as underwriters under Section 11?

Last practice March 11.

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Justine Jung & Nathan Nelson

1. Is the compelled disclosure of a memorized passcode to unlock a cell phone a testimonial act protected by the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and if so, should the disclosure be compelled under the “foregone conclusion” doctrine developed in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)?

2. If the “foregone conclusion” doctrine applies to the compelled disclosure of a cellphone passcode, in order to satisfy that doctrine, must the government demonstrate that it knows that the password exists, and that the defendant knows the password, or instead must the government demonstrate that it knows of the identity and contents of the specific files and items that it seeks on the cell phone?

Last practice March 24.

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Madison Boucher and Cecilia Grimaldi

I. Did the Boyd Gaming Control Board and Commission improperly revoke Mr. Carter’s gaming license for invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege when he violated federal law and reasonably feared answering the purported questions would lead to prosecution?

II. Did the Boyd Gaming Control Board and Commission exceed the scope of their statutory authority when they revoked Mr. Carter’s license for state-permitted medical marijuana use, despite such a revocation directly conflicting with the Boyd Constitution, state statutes, and legislative intent?

Last practice March 11.

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Nathan Guerrero and Nikayla Johnson

1. Is Kingsley v. Hendrickson’s objective standard limited to excessive force claims, or does it apply to deliberate indifference claims?

2. Was the prison warden deliberately indifferent to Mr. Green’s serious medical need during his pretrial detention in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment?

3. Following his conviction, was the Department of Corrections deliberately indifferent to Mr. Green’s serious medical need after his conviction in violation of the Eighth Amendment by denying him access to gender confirmation surgery?

Last practice March 11.

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Jenna Zendarski, Rachel Winer

Last practice March 23.

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Maddie Thomas & Zhi Yang Tan

Question Presented:

1. Whether an employee has a common law claim against an employer for the employer’s alleged violation of a public policy set forth in state law related to maintaining a safe work environment and, concurrently, whether an employee subjected to an unsafe work environment, in violation of public policy, may also pursue a common law claim for constructive discharge based on a single instance of being placed in an unsafe work environment.

2. Whether an employee is barred from pursuing a claim of negligence under section 1240(2)(A) of the Wagner Workers Compensation Law (WWCL) when the employer allegedly failed to provide a safe work environment during a novel pandemic.

Last practice March 11.

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Yasmine Hajjaji and Megan Pham

 1. Whether a permanent art exhibit composed of commissioned works constitutes a “collective work” under 17 U.S.C. § 101(2).

2. Whether a copyright registration that was issued due to a clerical error by the United States Copyright Office constitutes a registration that “has been made” (a “Granted Registration”) under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)’s pre-suit registration requirement.

Last practice March 12.

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